



Stony Brook
University

Department of Economics SPRING 2022 SEMINAR SERIES

Silent Spreaders: Behavior and Equilibrium Under Asymptomatic Infection

This paper analyzes equilibrium social distancing choices in a model which potentially asymptomatic infection. Since infection only prompts symptoms with a certain probability, individuals cannot perfectly infer their health status from the absence of symptoms. Instead, they must form beliefs about their health state based on knowledge of the population frequencies. I show that relative to a benchmark with perfect health state information, asymptomatic infection leads to lower mitigation through fatalism, through the force of infection and because of reduced severity. The model is then applied to an analysis of individual and mass testing. The value of the former derives from the value of information and it is shown that the latter may influence the course of the epidemic through its influence on aggregate equilibrium behavior. Tests for immunity generally have a higher value of information and aggregate effects than tests for infection.



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Monday, MARCH 7, 2022

1:00 - 2:20 PM

SBS, N603

This semester we are presenting **in-person** seminar series!

All in-person seminars will be held in the Social & Behavioral Sciences Building (Room N603).

For additional information, contact our seminar organizers:

Steven Stern and David Wiczer.

Visit our seminar webpage for additional information or **Scan the QR code:**

